Uncivil Disobedience: Political Commitment and Violence

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special character of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with others as co-members in the on-going political project of living together. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience

Thyroid Hormone as a Method of Reducing Damage to Donor Hearts after Circulatory Arrest

There is a chronic lack of donor hearts to meet the need for heart transplant both in the US and worldwide. Further, the use of available hearts is limited by the short period between collection and implantation during which the heart can be safely preserved ex vivo. Using mid-thermic Langendorff machine perfusion, we have been able to preserve the metabolic function of a healthy heart for up to 8 hours, twice the limit for current static cold storage. We have also been able to preserve the metabolic function of a damaged DCD Heart collected 30 minutes after cardiac arrest for a period of 8 hours. We further investigated whether it was possible to improve the preservation of DCD heart using treatment with 10 μM Triiodothyronine to stimulate the tissue metabolism and we did find a reduction in damage markers in the treated DCD hearts as compared to the untreated group

In defense of exclusionary reasons

Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut

Legitimacy and institutional purpose

Institutions undertake a huge variety of constitutive purposes. One of the roles of legitimacy is to protect and promote an institution’s pursuit of its purpose; state legitimacy is generally understood as the right to rule, for example. When considering legitimacy beyond the state, we have to take account of how differences in purposes change legitimacy. I focus in particular on how differences in purpose matter for the stringency of the standards that an institution must meet in order to be legitimate. An important characteristic of an institution’s purpose is its deontic status, i.e. whether it is morally impermissible, merely permissible, or mandatory. Although this matters, it does so in some non-obvious ways; the mere fact of a morally impermissible purpose is not necessarily delegitimating, for example. I also consider the problem of conflicting, multiple, and contested institutional purposes, and the different theoretical roles for institutional purpose. Understanding how differences in purpose matter for an institution’s legitimacy is one part of the broader project of theorizing institutional legitimacy in the many contexts beyond the traditional context of the state

Juniperus of Canada and the United States: Taxonomy, Key and Distribution.

The taxonomy of Juniperus of Canada and the United States is reviewed and keys to the 18 species, 5 varieties and 3 formas are presented as well as distribution maps.Integrative Biolog

Visual Perception as Patterning: Cavendish against Hobbes on Sensation

Many of Margaret Cavendish’s criticisms of Thomas Hobbes in the Philosophical Letters (1664) relate to the disorder and damage that she holds would result if Hobbesian pressure were the cause of visual perception. In this paper, I argue that her “two men” thought experiment in Letter IV is aimed at a different goal: to show the explanatory potency of her account. First, I connect Cavendish’s view of visual perception as “patterning” to the “two men” thought experiment in Letter IV. Second, I provide a potential reply on Hobbes’s behalf that appeals to physiological differences between perceivers’ sense organs, drawing upon Hobbes’s optics in De homine. Third, I argue that such a reply would misunderstand Cavendish’s objective of showing the limited explanatory resources available in understanding visual perception as pressing when compared to her view of visual perception as patterning

Grounding procedural rights

Contrary to the widely accepted consensus, Christopher Heath Wellman argues that there are no pre-institutional judicial procedural rights. Thus commonly affirmed rights like the right to a fair trial cannot be assumed in the literature on punishment and legal philosophy as they usually are. Wellman canvasses and rejects a variety of grounds proposed for such rights. I answer his skepticism by proposing two novel grounds for procedural rights. First, a general right against unreasonable risk of punishment grounds rights to an institutionalized system of punishment. Second, to complement and extend the first ground, I more controversially propose a right to provision of the robust good of security. People have a right to others' protecting for avoiding wrongfully harming them: when I take an action that is reasonably expected to threaten the protected interests of others, I must take appropriate care to avoid setting back those interests. Inflicting punishment on someone--intentionally harming them in response to a violation--is prima facie wrongful, so I can only count as taking appropriate care in punishing when I follow familiar procedures that reliably and redundantly test whether they are liable to such punishment, i.e. whether they have forfeited their right against punishment through a culpable act

Institutional Legitimacy

Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference. Understanding legitimacy in this way favorably contrasts with legitimacy understood in the traditional way, as the right to rule correlating to a duty of obedience. It helps unify our discourses of legitimacy across a wider range of practices, especially including the many evaluations we increasingly make of international institutions of various sorts, but also including domestic institutions

Efficient Optimization of Loops and Limits with Randomized Telescoping Sums

We consider optimization problems in which the objective requires an inner loop with many steps or is the limit of a sequence of increasingly costly approximations. Meta-learning, training recurrent neural networks, and optimization of the solutions to differential equations are all examples of optimization problems with this character. In such problems, it can be expensive to compute the objective function value and its gradient, but truncating the loop or using less accurate approximations can induce biases that damage the overall solution. We propose randomized telescope (RT) gradient estimators, which represent the objective as the sum of a telescoping series and sample linear combinations of terms to provide cheap unbiased gradient estimates. We identify conditions under which RT estimators achieve optimization convergence rates independent of the length of the loop or the required accuracy of the approximation. We also derive a method for tuning RT estimators online to maximize a lower bound on the expected decrease in loss per unit of computation. We evaluate our adaptive RT estimators on a range of applications including meta-optimization of learning rates, variational inference of ODE parameters, and training an LSTM to model long sequences